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This latest update of the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy includes the new information 
obtained since the last projections were published in December 
2017.1 The exercise includes, in particular, the Quarterly National 
Accounts data for the last quarter of 2017, and also information on 
the changes in the technical assumptions on which the projection 
exercise is based (see Table 1).2
The projections envisage a continuation of the current expansionary 
phase of the Spanish economy. This outlook is based, on one 
hand, on the gradual correction of the macrofinancial imbalances 
that built up in the expansionary cycle which preceded the crisis 
and in the more deeply recessionary stages of the crisis. This 
correction has given rise, in particular, to lower private sector debt, 
continued and sizeable external surpluses and the consequent 
moderation in net external borrowing, the gradual correction of the 
budget deficit, the fall in unemployment, which is however still too 
high, and the stabilisation and incipient recovery of the real estate 
sector. On the other hand, a number of more temporary factors 
also continue to support economic activity, such as the strength of 
the export markets, against a backdrop of ever more widespread 
global growth, and the expected expansionary stance of demand 
policies throughout the projection horizon. In particular, on the 
information available at this stage (which does not include the 
draft State Budget as it has still not been published), and following 
the neutral fiscal policy stance observed in 2017, a return to a 
somewhat more expansionary stance is expected as from 2018.
GDP has grown at a rate of more than 3% in the last three years; 
it is estimated that it will grow at a somewhat lower rate over the 
projection horizon. On one hand, the outlook for the global 
economy points to a gradual loss of momentum of the external 
markets. On the other, the present rate of expansion of economic 
activity in the euro area makes it more likely that inflation will 
converge towards its medium-term target. This reduces the need 
for additional monetary policy measures, in a setting in which the 
measures adopted previously should have a progressively lower 
incremental impact on financial conditions, activity and prices. 
Moreover, as discussed below, household spending on consumer 
goods and services should continue to show the signs of 
moderation that first appeared in 2017. The short-term information 
suggests that GDP growth in 2018 Q1 may have remained at the 
level of 0.7% observed in the third and fourth quarters of 2017. 
The minor slowdown in activity that is expected in coming quarters 
would give GDP growth of 2.7% in 2018, 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% 
in 2020 (see Table 2).
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020)
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2017-2020): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2017 
joint forecasting exercise.
2  The cut-off date for the assumptions underlying the December 2017 
projections was 22 November. The cut-off date for preparation of the 
assumptions underlying this exercise is 9  March, except for those 
relating to Spain’s export markets, for which the assumptions for the 
current exercise are taken from the March 2018 ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, whose cut-off date is 13 February. Lastly, 
the cut-off date for preparation of these projections is 13 March.
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Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 9 March 2018. Cut-off date for foreign markets assumptions: 13 February 2018. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; 
the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for world output and export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
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The prolongation of the expansionary phase, on the back of 
increased capacity utilisation, will give rise to a gradual pick-up in 
the rate of growth of the underlying component of the CPI which, 
after climbing by 1.2% in 2018, is expected to accelerate to 1.9% 
in 2020. In the case of headline inflation, the projections point to 
an average annual rate of change of 1.2% in 2018, rising to 1.7% 
in 2020.
The main changes in the assumptions on which these projections 
are built in comparison with the December projections concern 
budgetary policy. In this respect, the recent agreement on public 
sector pay and employment between the Government and the 
main trade union organisations for the period 2018-20203 is 
particularly noteworthy. The agreement includes a fixed pay 
increase for public sector employees of 6% in cumulative terms in 
the period (1.75% in 2018, 2.25% in 2019 and 2% in 2020). It also 
establishes two additional tranches that are dependent on certain 
conditions being met; if these conditions are satisfied, the 
cumulative increase would be just under 9%.4 As regards public 
sector employment, the agreement adds momentum in 2018 to 
the more dynamic hiring policy of the past two years.5 In particular, 
it broadens the range of cases where up to 100% of general 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
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Average data 17.2 15.1 13.3 11.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) of the nation (% of GDP) 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) (% of GDP) -3.1 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
March 2018 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2017 Q4.
a Projections cut-off date: 13 March 2018.
Units left-hand scale
4  In particular, regarding the pay increase, the first variable tranche is tied 
to economic growth: if GDP grows by 2.5% or more in 2019 and 2020, 
the pay increase would be 2.5% in 2019 and 3% in 2020. If GDP grows 
by less than 2.5%, the pay increase would decline in proportion to the 
extent to which the figure falls short of 2.5%. The second variable 
tranche consists in adding a further 0.55 pp to the 2020 pay increase if 
the budgetary stability target is met.
5  See the agreement signed between the Government and the trade 
unions on 29 March 2017 (available only in Spanish). In this respect, see 
also the discussion in “General government employment over the past 
decade”, Economic Bulletin 4/2017, Economic Notes, Banco de España.
3  See http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/minhap/ 
Paginas/2018/090318-funcionarios.aspx (available only in Spanish).
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government staff vacancies may be filled (and adds some cases 
where the replacement rate may be even higher), and includes 
additional measures relating to working hours and temporary 
employment. The agreement includes certain conditional factors 
tied to compliance with the budgetary rules.
At the cut‑off date for this exercise, the draft State and Social 
Security Budget for 2018 had not been submitted. Accordingly, as 
in December 2017, various technical assumptions have been used 
to estimate the expected trajectories of fiscal policy variables. It 
has been assumed, first, that the budget headings subject to 
greater scope for discretion – notably including, by virtue of their 
volume, procurement and public investment – will evolve in 
keeping with the nominal potential growth of the Spanish economy 
and the latest developments in budget outturn,6 and second, that 
all other general government account items will evolve, in the 
absence of measures, in keeping with their usual determinants.7
In accordance with these assumptions and projections on fiscal 
policy variables, and with the output gap estimated on a consistent 
basis within the whole projection exercise, the fiscal policy stance 
is set to be slightly expansionary in 2018, compared with the 
neutral stance estimated for 2017.
As regards all the other assumptions, there are few new developments 
and their impact on activity and prices tend to cancel one another 
out. The main change, in terms of its effects on the projections, is the 
improved global economic outlook, which is reflected in the upward 
revision, by 0.3 percentage points in cumulative terms between 2018 
and 2019, in the rate of growth of Spain’s export markets. In addition, 
since the cut‑off date for the previous projections, the euro exchange 
rate has appreciated further, by 3.3 pp in effective nominal terms and 
rather more markedly (by 5.4  pp) against the dollar. Oil prices in 
dollars have risen slightly more than expected, especially in the short 
term, hence the upward revision of 4.9% for 2018 (tempered to a 
great extent in euro terms by the appreciation of the currency) and 
the more modest downward revision for 2019 and 2020.
In accordance with the expectations implicit in the yield curves, 
since the cut‑off date for the assumptions underlying the previous 
projections the expected trajectory for interbank market rates has 
moved up, while the expected trajectory for government debt 
yields has moved down. In any event, these are minor changes, 
with a negligible impact on the expected cost of lending to 
households and non‑financial corporations. 
On the impacts estimated drawing on historical evidence, the 
changes in the assumptions overall – including the fiscal policy 
assumptions – compared with the December projections would 
give rise to an upward revision of expected GDP growth of 
approximately 0.1 pp in each of the three years of the projection 
horizon. This is mainly attributable to the expansionary fiscal 
measures (in particular, the stronger growth expected in public 
sector pay and employment) and, to a lesser extent, to the 
improved situation of the external markets, factors which are 
restrained somewhat by the exchange rate appreciation.
This revision of the outlook for Spanish economic activity is slightly 
more extensive in the first years of the exercise than would be 
justified by automatic application of the effect of the new 
assumptions. Specifically, the upward revisions to GDP growth 
amount to 0.3 pp in 2018, 0.2 pp in 2019 and 0.1 pp in 2020. This 
reflects a combination of factors. First, the information on the 
opening months of 2018 points to a somewhat higher rate of 
growth in Q1 than was expected at the end of 2017, and this more 
favourable pattern is also being carried over into Q2. Second, the 
flow of data on the external environment of the Spanish economy 
received in the month that has elapsed since the cut‑off date for 
the relevant assumptions has been more positive than expected at 
the time. Lastly, the baseline scenario includes a slight easing of 
the political tension in Catalonia, as a consequence of the decline 
in the level of uncertainty since December.
In terms of growth in consumer prices, the impact of the new 
assumptions is broadly neutral, since the upward effects deriving 
from the fiscal expansion are countered by the exchange rate 
appreciation and by the rather more moderate rate of growth of oil 
prices in 2019 and 2020. However, the information now available 
on the most recent period warrants a downward revision of 0.2 pp 
in the rate of change of CPI for 2018, essentially owing to the 
performance of the energy component in the last few months. The 
projections for 2019 and 2020 are virtually unchanged. 
In the projection period, spending on consumer goods and services 
will continue to be underpinned by the strength of the job creation 
process, continuing favourable financial conditions and the 
improvement in recent years in the financial position of the sector, as 
a consequence of the reduction in indebtedness and the appreciation 
in both real and financial asset prices. However, it is estimated that the 
slowdown observed in this spending component in 2017 will continue. 
This is as a result of various factors. First, spending decisions on 
consumer durables, which had been put off during the years of the 
crisis and which households have gradually resumed in the recovery 
years,8 are expected to peter out over the projection period. Second, 
it is estimated that households will start to rebuild their savings from 
boX 1 mAcroeconomic proJections For the spAnish economy (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
6  The projections also include possible costs associated with the public 
liability arising from court proceedings relating to toll motorway company 
insolvency proceedings, which the Government estimates as around 
€2 billion.
7  Specifically it has been assumed that public revenue will increase in 
keeping with its tax bases, which depend mainly on the macroeconomic 
environment. Similar assumptions have been made for expenditure 
items that offer less scope for discretion. This is the case of pensions 
(where developments are essentially determined by the revaluation 
formula established by law and population ageing), unemployment 
benefits (which depend mainly on the level of unemployment) and 
interest payments (affected by changes in public debt levels and interest 
rates).
8  J. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption dynamics in 
Spain by product type”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de 
España, pp. 29‑37.
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boX 1 mAcroeconomic proJections For the spAnish economy (2018‑2020) (cont’d)
the low level estimated at the end of 2017 (just under 6% of disposable 
income, the lowest level since the start of 2008). Indeed, in 2017 
households experienced a squeeze on their real income as a result of 
a temporary rebound in inflation that agents apparently recognised as 
such, since they responded by reducing both their real spending and 
their saving. The assumption underlying these projections is that 
households will tend to moderate their consumer spending, in favour 
of a certain degree of recovery in their saving rate.
Lastly, the projections assume a rise in interest rates which, per se, 
has a minor impact on household income as it affects interest paid 
and interest received alike. However, it also has a negative effect 
on consumption, given that borrowers generally have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume than creditors.
In the case of gross fixed capital formation, it is expected that the 
residential component will continue to post high rates of growth, 
albeit slightly lower than those observed in 2017, in a context in 
which the trend towards favourable mortgage terms (such as lower 
interest rates and longer repayment periods) seen in recent years 
looks to be starting to fade and net lending by households has fallen 
sharply. Business investment, for its part, will continue to be 
underpinned by the strength of demand and the increase in capacity 
utilisation, in a setting in which the high generation of internal funds 
and the availability of borrowed funds on favourable conditions will 
continue to ease the way for financing of business investment.
Over the projection period as a whole, exports should continue to 
grow at a faster pace than their destination markets, thanks to the 
competitiveness gains achieved since the crisis and which are 
expected to continue into coming years, albeit at a slower pace. In 
the near term, however, the rate of growth of export sales will be 
mitigated by the effects of the appreciation of the euro since early 
2017. By components, it is estimated that tourism services will 
moderate somewhat following the exceptional performance in 
recent years, as some Spanish tourist destinations become 
overcrowded and alternative destinations in the Mediterranean 
basin start to recover. Imports, for their part, as in other recent 
projection exercises, are expected to grow at a slower pace than 
their historical relationship with final demand would warrant, as a 
result of the incipient import substitution process prompted by the 
competitiveness gains achieved.
As is commonly the case during the expansionary phases of the 
Spanish economy, employment growth is set to remain closely 
pegged to growth in economic activity. The rapid pace of job 
growth will push down the unemployment rate further, although it 
will remain well above pre‑crisis levels, at around 11% at the end 
of the projection horizon. This high level of unemployment is one 
of the factors constraining wage growth, although wages are 
expected to pick up over the next three years as the slack in the 
labour market decreases. Given that a parallel rise in productivity 
is not anticipated, this will push up unit labour costs. However, the 
rise in ULCs will be less than the ECB projects for the euro area as 
a whole, so the increase will still be compatible with continuing 
competitiveness gains relative to the euro area.
The Spanish economy will maintain its net lending position vis‑à‑
vis the rest of the world, although it will be a few tenths of a percent 
lower than estimated for 2017 (when it stood at 1.9% of GDP). In 
particular, the goods and services surplus will remain around 
2.7%, driven by two opposing forces: improved net trade flows in 
real terms and the deterioration in terms of trade. However, the 
rising interest rates foreseen in the external assumptions point to 
a slight worsening of the income balance.
On the consumer prices front, current projections envisage core 
inflation accelerating gradually from its current low levels. 
Forecast GDP growth over the projection horizon outpaces the 
existing estimates of the rate of growth of potential output. 
Therefore, the positive output gap that emerged, on our estimates, 
at the end of 2017 will tend to widen over the next three years, 
which is likely to drive up domestic inflationary pressures. Profit 
margins are expected to stabilise after the cumulative gains made 
in recent years. After a sharp increase in 2017, on the back of 
rapidly rising prices of oil and other commodities, external 
inflationary pressures will tend to moderate at the start of the 
projection horizon, thanks to the recent appreciation of the euro. 
However, they are likely to pick up again further down the line, 
given the expected gradual increase in global inflationary 
pressures while the slack in the global economy is gradually 
absorbed. Consequently, the CPI is projected to rise by 1.2% this 
year, following a path largely determined by the energy component 
which, on current oil‑price assumptions, is likely to head up over 
the coming months to reach a peak in the summer before 
subsequently slackening off. For the next two years, the CPI is 
forecast to rise by 1.4% in 2019 and 1.7% in 2020.
The risks to the baseline economic growth scenario are mainly on 
the upside in the near term, as ongoing revisions to the projections 
for the global economy suggest that its expansionary momentum 
may be underestimated. By contrast, towards the end of the 
projection horizon, the risks are likely to be on the downside. On 
the domestic front, current projections assume that the decline in 
political uncertainty regarding the situation in Catalonia observed 
since the December projections will continue going forward. 
However, a resurgence of tension cannot be ruled out, with the 
consequent negative impact on the economy, particularly in 
Catalonia itself. Moreover, some recent announcements suggest a 
possible easing of budgetary consolidation efforts, beyond those 
already included in the baseline scenario. Although this would 
have expansionary effects in the short term, over a longer horizon 
it would exacerbate the economy’s vulnerability to adverse shocks, 
given the high level of public debt and the need to undertake 
significant public debt reduction over the medium term. In the 
opposite direction, the baseline scenario includes the assumption 
of a partial recovery in the household saving rate, particularly after 
the sharp drop in 2017. However, the upturn in this variable may 
be less pronounced, leading to faster household consumption 
growth, and thus higher GDP growth.
On the external front, the new grand coalition agreement in 
Germany could give rise to a more expansionary budgetary policy 
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in that country, which in the near term could boost the rate of 
growth in the euro area as a whole. However, the tensions in 
financial markets seen in early February suggest that the process 
of monetary policy normalisation in the advanced economies, and 
especially in the United States, is not without its uncertainties. In 
particular, an unexpectedly severe intensification of inflationary 
pressures could trigger fresh bouts of abrupt price corrections in 
financial markets. In this connection, the recent adoption of fiscal 
expansion plans in the United States has heightened these risks, 
as it has taken place in an economy with a very high degree of 
capacity utilisation. Other causes of uncertainty include, first, the 
possibility that the decision by the United States to impose tariffs 
on imports of steel and aluminium may trigger a spiral of similar 
measures by the authorities in other countries, with the attendant 
adverse effects on world trade. Second, various sources of 
geopolitical tension persist, including in Europe the continuing 
lack of clarity about the shape the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom will ultimately take and 
the uncertainty surrounding the formation of a government in Italy, 
following the outcome of the last election.
The risks to prices appear to be balanced. The downside risks 
described above for the global economy also represent downside 
risks for the external component of inflation. Moreover, as noted, 
the projections rely on the assumption that wages and prices will 
respond to the reduction in the degree of slack to a greater extent 
than they have done since the start of the expansionary phase – a 
hypothesis that may fail to materialise.  Nevertheless, the existence 
of non‑linear effects in the relationship between economic activity 
and prices cannot be ruled out, such that after a certain point is 
passed, the reduction in cyclical slack starts to have ever larger 
inflationary impacts. Furthermore, the synchronisation of strong 
global economic growth suggests possible upward pressures on 
commodity prices. However, in the specific case of oil, these 
pressures would be offset by the fact that they would make a 
larger number of unconventional oil sources economically viable.
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